Ceasefires are a difficult thing to achieve. No more so than in the conflicts of the Middle East. Without ceasefires civilians caught in wars remain vulnerable. As recent events in the Middle East have demonstrated though ceasefires are difficult to negotiate and are far more likely to breakdown than succeed. When it comes to the notion of negotiating ceasefires with Islamist groups in particular there is a widely held belief in Western policy-making circles that the tasks is even harder if not impossible. This is because such counterparts are frequently viewed as holding absolutist goals and positions which are entirely incompatible with peace-making. In this article I present analysis of one such group the Palestinian Hamas movement. I find evidence that far from seeking to prolong conflict Hamas has offered ceasefires and calms on repeated occasions to Israel. This article contends that the willingness of Hamas, however, is circumscribed by the context of conflict and its other actors as well as the unwillingness of mediators and negotiations to explore inclusion of such groups into the political process.
Introduction
Ten years after Palestinians freely elected Hamas to power in the West Bank and Gaza Strip prospects for peace between Israel and the Palestinians have only worsened. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as is increasingly the case elsewhere in the Middle East, multidimensional and protracted. Islamist groups, like Hamas have come to play a fundamental part in the conflict dynamic. Their role is also key determinant in peace-making. 1 Many though contend the Hamas is a force for conflict not peace. 2 In this article we explore the extent to which mechanisms for peace-making such as a ceasefire are helpful in understanding whether a group like Hamas is interested in peace or only conflict. We explore the populist Western consensus that groups such as Hamas are embarked on a terroristic trajectory and nihilistic criminality and defiant in the face of attempts at peace-making. 3 The purpose of this article is to address this issue, and provide analysis on Islamists and what might be called peace overtures of truce and ceasefire by examining Hamas. The research is particularly relevant for peace-keeping and peace-building literatures because truce and ceasefires can be a key factor in transforming pauses in war or violence conflict to negotiated peace. 4 Yet we contend that the utility of ceasefires 5 for purposes of confidencebuilding and negotiation for peace settlements are circumscribed. The reduction of the hudna into a tactical pause has become a default outcome of the manner in which others respond to and deal Hamas and its demands -whether they are made politically through performance at the ballot box or down the barrel of a gun.
In this article the terms 'warriors break' or 'tactical pause' refer to an operational halt in hostilities so as to re-group, review strategy and address anew conflict. With respect to Hamas these ceasefires or pauses arise out of decision-making processes within the leadership of the entire movement rather than operational field decisions by commanders of Hamas's armed wing. 6 For state actors like Israel or the US groups like Hamas are perceived as incapable of a halt in violent conflict for any other reason than to rearm and regroup. They see such offers from Hamas as only a tactical operational pause. Other reasons for a ceasefire as it may relate to negotiation or building for reconciliation or peace are perceived as inconceivable. 7 3 Perry and Negrin, Theory and practice 4 Fortna, Peacetime 5 These ceasefires are known in Arabic as hudna or pauses in conflict tahdiyeh 6 The military wing of Hamas is known as the Izz-a-din al-Qassam Brigades 7 Beaty, Effects Working against such contentions the Hamas leadership have, as this article goes to show, have not only offered ceasefires on repeated occasions but been willing to leverage a ceasefire beyond a tactical pause towards a negotiated and more sustainable resolution of the conflict. In this respect, however, such signals have been stymied by political competitors and adversaries alike. The failures or unwillingness of other actors, including powerful mediators such as the US, to use ceasefires as an opportunity to pursue conflict management and peace-building has further undermined their usefulness for negotiation and wider conflict resolution.
The opportunity to explore the potentiality of ceasefires in relation to Islamist groups, occupying state forces and international mediators speaks to a number of ongoing conflicts in the Middle East. Indeed, attempts to initiate truce agreements, temporary pauses in conflicts and long-term ceasefires as a step to negotiated resolution of these complex conflicts has never been more urgent. The collapse or absence of such initiatives has attendant consequences for the stability of the wider region.
Explaining Hamas's motivation in signing up to ceasefires is subject to contested and varied interpretations. The decision to engage is explained according to a number of competing explanations: prosaic resource mobilization and political opportunity, strategic military realities in relation to the movement's relative weakness at the time particularly with respect to Israel's ongoing measures against the Palestinians, intra-group competition with the PLO, political bidding and legitimacy, defining and redefining resistance. What is largely absent from such rationalizations of Hamas discourse on this matter is reference to theological positioning on hudna.
Additionally, the research is particularly relevant, because it examines the opportunities and constraints within Islamist groups for ceasefire. It also highlights that a ceasefire is not sufficient in and of itself to move conflicts from violence to peace. Thus, as policymakers and diplomats ponder the challenges of mediation and negotiation of multi-dimensional and prolonged conflicts, this article helps ascertain the limitations of state and non-state actors alike. While some conclusions of this article can only be specific to this case, the findings may also be relevant to other multi-dimensional conflicts in the Middle East. This is especially the case where Islamist actors are part of violent conflicts. This is because of the dominance of particular discourses of distrust of Islamism in Western policy-making circles.
This leaves them predisposed against Islamists and the possibilities of negotiating ceasefires for peace.
Debating the discourse to cease fire
Many contributions to the discourse on peace-building address the importance of a ceasefire in foundations for peace between state and non-state armed actors or resistance groups. 8 In the wake of the Cold War and with the explosion of new ethno-national conflicts scholars were concerned to examine the potentiality of ceasefires not only for the management but the negotiated resolution of conflicts. 9 There was also an emerging consensus that to halt a conflict in this way addressed an important humanitarian dimension in environments where civilian casualty rates and disruption to society was greatest. 10 Such literatures also recognise that cease-fires can be delicate and subject to repeated breakdown and conflict resumption. 11 The role of mediators and negotiators has also been identified as an important element of such approaches particularly as they relate to timing, persuasion and promotion of cease-fire beyond a halt to violence. 12 From the standpoint of much western literature ceasefire timing is also considered to have an important effect on negotiations which create political thresholds for conflict resolution and peace. 13 A strategy of intervention by outside parties to establish a ceasefire is recommended once violence has passed its fever pitch and as part of the peace settlement process. 14 This has given rise to critiques that focus on the short-lived efficacy of such approaches and endogenous drivers of original conflict causes and the difficulties which third parties encounter in such processes. 15 As has been argued in contexts as diverse as Northern Ireland, Afghanistan and DRC ceasefires in such circumstance can give parties to 8 DeSoto, "Ending violent conflict"; Zartman, "Mediation" 9 Touval, "Ethical Dilemmas "; Hauss, International Conflict 10 In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, civilian casualty rates on both sides are higher than military ones (http://www.btselem.org/statistics). 11 15 Reid, "Finding a Peace"; Bercovitch and Gartner, "Overcoming Obstacles" the cessation of hostilities time to rearm and recalibrate their goals leading not only to resumption of hostilities but rising death tolls. 16 Crocker, for example, contends that such pauses in conflicts lead to "muscle-flexing on both sides, adding to the conflict's already massive scar tissue of distrust". 17 He thus argues that unless intimately tied to a political settlement process such ceasefires have limited utility and can even aggravate conflict. Such a perspective identifies the command within violence for otherwise disempowered political actors. It acknowledges the dynamic of violence as power in contesting legitimacy in fragile societies and broken states. 18
Hamas: a dimension of modern martial Islam?
Hamas -the Islamic Resistance Movement -proves a useful case study in this discussion.
Hamas, founded in 1987, is typified in most academic literature as a broad political-socio movement that is also engaged in sustained conflict with the state of Israel as occupier of Muslim waqf territory. 19 Hamas is also a rival and competitor to factions of the Palestinian secular national movement, specifically Fatah. The rising popularity of the movement can be attributed, at least in part, to the perceived failures of Fatah within the political framework of the Oslo peace process to bring a lasting peace settlement, and dissatisfaction at its control of the institutions of the Palestinian Authority (PA). 20 Some studies depict Hamas as primarily a terrorist organization with all other activities subsumed. 21 Hamas's interpretation of particular Muslim motifs, it has been contended, is ideologically predisposed to jihad of a particular kind. 22 One of the ways in which Hamas, at this point in its early evolution, was defining its position in relation to its enemy (Israel) was in terms of the religious legitimacy bestowed and accrued to its cause by defining its violence against Israel as jihad. This also allowed it to draw a distinction against their fedayi rivals in Fatah. Israel was deemed an illegitimate entity and occupier by Hamas. Hamas wasn't just a resistance organization (like the PLO) but it was an Islamic resistance organization and hence obliged (fard ayn) to engage in jihad.
Hamas perceived resistance as a Muslim duty "the day that enemies usurp part of Moslem land, Jihad becomes the individual duty of every Moslem." 28 As such jihad was initially defined by them according to some of the classic norms of war in Islam, including important injunctions against targeting civilians. 29
By and large Hamas initially defined its position around those Koranic passages and previous historical instances in Muslim history such as Salah Eddin's war against the Crusader occupation of Jerusalem which allowed for war to be waged under specific circumstances.
As with the Koran, Hamas defined its early position as one of defined and limited warfare rather than limitless terror and violence. 30 Hamas began to give ideological import to certain dimensions of fiqh 31 on jihad with far-reaching consequences for the ways in which it signified itself and was signified by others. 32 It is also apparent that Hamas omitted those passages of Koranic, religious literature and history which addressed overtures of 27 By hudna here we are referring to the classical Islamic term of a long-term truce between Muslims and their enemies. The enemy here can be both internal (a fellow Muslim) or external. In the period beginning in 628 C.E. the Prophet Mohammad called for a ten-year ceasefire, known as the Truce of Hudaybieh, with his enemies from the Quraysh tribe. During the hudna the two sides were to live in peace. In the Palestinian context the application of hudna for nationalist purposes by armed factions such as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (Fatah's military wing) and the mapping out and commitment of leftist radical factions of the PFLP and DFLP also contributed to the reinterpretation and ownership of the hudna. This made it increasingly more difficult for the 42 Zahar, Author interview 43 Gunning, concept to be viewed primarily from a historico-religious lens or for Hamas to claim it for itself alone.
In contrast to Gunning Hroub contends that Hamas "bound by its religious roots ... felt the need to justify its adoption of a controversial policy [a hudna] on Islamic religious grounds". 44 It was reasoned that if fiqh of jihad had been employed to justify violent attack against Israel then fiqh limiting or ceasing such violent attacks was necessary to preserve the movement's Islamist character. Hardliners within the movement remained sceptical of a ceasefire and this was indicative in statements from leaders such as Abdel Aziz Rantissi: "as long as we are under occupation we have to continue fighting until we finish this mission.
The formula is not cease-fire because we are not two states facing each other across a border. We are under occupation and we are defending ourselves. So the word ceasefire is not working here but resistance and occupation. They should stop occupation and then we will stop resistance". 45
Political objectives
Hamas's experience of negotiating the June 2003 hudna also revealed that they would determine their position on strategic political objectives linked to their rivalry (and later enmity) with Fatah. Here, we argue, the discourse on jihad, hudna and avoidance of fitnah (internal chaos) was more ambiguous. Nevertheless Hamas leaders argued that for the sake of unity against their common enemy (Israel) and to avoid internal strife (fitnah) with Fatah agreement over a ceasefire was possible. This reveals a flexibility and pragmatic political utility to ceasefire in terms of internal conflicts involving rivalry between a local Islamist and nationalist actors.
Hamas leader Ismail Abu Shanab, who was a key figure in promoting the ceasefire mechanism explained the import of unity declaring that, "first of all we want to ... find common ground with other groups and leave our differences aside. That's the golden rule. The common ground is: Intifada, resisting the occupation, developing better Palestinian life and reform and developing a Palestinian state and struggling towards the return of the refugees. Those are 44 Hroub, HAMAS: 55 45 Rantissi, Author interview the main targets on the document that we tried to establish". 46 Internal unity, of the kind addressed in the ceasefire to which the Palestinian factions signed up in June 2003 was a way in which the goal of protection from a foreign occupier and unity to confront that particular foe could be better achieved. This was a goal that Hamas could sign up to.
It is contended, therefore, that the first hudna unilaterally declared by the Palestinians addressed Hamas's fundamental concern to present itself as Islamist and legitimate both in terms of Israel to whom it had declared a jihad against and its Palestinian nationalist rivals with whom it should avoid internal chaos or civil war with. More generally Palestinian supporters of Hamas also reacted positively to the declaration. This constructive reaction signalled that those who had feared that a Hamas ceasefire would gravely weaken popular support if it appeared to abandon jihad could be mistaken.
Some supporters of Hamas, however, remained unconvinced that a ceasefire would provide sufficient political dividends compared to those wrought against Israel from armed violence.
This established a tension in terms of political and military leaders or hardliners and moderates in the movement though these terms were not always mutually exclusive. The Hamas political leadership, in particular, has always tacitly recognised that a political outcome was inevitable in the conflict with Israel. Moreover there were elements of the Hamas leadership that believed that a hudna would set the stage for negotiations and signalled ideological pragmatism. 47 It was a signal, however, that was regarded with deep suspicion by other actors. Israel was disbelieving, with the argument circulated that Hamas's commitment to hudna was tactical, "merely inducing Hamas to stop attacks through a 46 Abu Shanab, Author interview 47 Hatina, "Hamas and the Oslo":37 hudna or truce is not acceptable, since Hamas will simply wait to fight again another day while keeping its capabilities intact". 48 The ceasefires of the second intifada period were largely a failure. Unilateral acts designed to achieve a pause in hostilities only lasted for short periods, Israeli reciprocation was limited and its military forces still continued to attack Palestinians and politically its leadership reinforced its practices of occupation. 49 The causes of the breakdown of the earlier ceasefires remain a source of debate. A number of lessons, however, were drawn. were specific that they would agree to conditions that constituted 'calm' rather than a ceasefire (hudna). Hamas leader Khaled Meshal argued that the move to reduce violence against Israel was an entirely legitimate element of maintaining the resistance. 51 The tahdiyah lasted for more than a year and in that time Hamas capitalised on the opportunity to contest Palestinian local and (and for the first time) legislative elections against its main rival in Fatah. 52 The political gain was apparent but weighed against wider ideological factors created tension within the movement as hardliners complained of a degree of capitulation in terms of resistance against Israel and salafi-jihadi elements such as al-Qaeda scorned and critiqued Hamas. By contesting for power in the local arena through elections Hamas abided by its own undertakings to desist from violent attacks against Israel.
Once again the Hamas leadership demonstrated how it could engender discipline and enforcement of such decisions over the entire movement, including the Izz-a-din al-Qassam Brigades. Hamas gained from its decision to halt violence against Israel as it was left relatively unhindered by Israel during this period to freely campaign and compete for votes.
The outcome of the elections, though a surprise, created the opportunity for Hamas to achieve political power; Hamas won 74 of the 132 seats in the Palestinian legislature and many Palestinian municipalities also became dominated by them. 53 Once elected to power its leadership initially indicated that the possibility of a long-term truce (hudna) could be back on the agenda and that it was prepared to negotiate on such terms. Khaled Meshal declared to Israel, "If you are willing to accept the principle of a longterm truce, we are prepared to negotiate the terms. Hamas is extending a hand of peace to those who are truly interested in a peace based on justice". 54 This scenario, however, was dependent on the reactions of other actors to Hamas' democratic victory and the ways in which the offer of a ceasefire was perceived and understood. Israel continued to reject such offers and contended that they were nothing more than rhetorical statements as Hamas 51 Meshal, "Interview, Al Ahram" 52 Milton-Edwards and Farrell, Hamas 53 Milton-Edwards, "Prepared for power" 54 Meshal, "We will not sell "; Butcher, "Hamas offers deal" 60 Israel was reported to be dragging its feet with international aid agencies reporting to US diplomats that there was "little improvement in Gazans' daily lives". 61 In this respect the confidence building measures often considered necessary for a ceasefire to hold and to lead to negotiation between contesting parties to reduce or resolve conflict was considered insufficient by one of the armed parties. As the tahdiyah progressed 58 Zahar, Author interview 59 al-Masri, Author interview 60 Thrall, "Hamas's Chances" 61 Walles, "Gaza: More food" throughout 2008 differences within the Hamas leadership also emerged. Gaza leader Ghazi
Hamad called the tahdiyah "dirty politics" but conceded that it had allowed Hamas to "jump into the political square in a very short time" but that the compromises that had been required of the movement had led to a "contradiction between resistance, politics and ideology". 62 Another Hamas leader put it more bluntly when he stated that despite the tahdiyah with Israel, "we [people in Gaza] are still struggling and suffering. There is a shortage of everything." He further asserted that while the tahdiyah had led to a "drop in the number of funerals the real fruits of the ceasefire such as agriculture development, building materials, etc. have not materialised. They such pauses as tactical and were increasingly referred to affiliate publications as the "warriors break" declaring that the "Zionist occupation yields unanimously to a reciprocal tahdiyah". 64 Wagemakers argues that Hamas have been compelled to scale back on the demands it could win from Israel in return for a form of ceasefire. 65 Hamas leaders such as Khaled Meshal began to articulate the tahdiyah explicitly in terms of Israel's blockade of Gaza and as a tactical response, "[its ] a tactic in conflict management and a phase in the framework of the resistance," continuing he said, "the tahdiya creates a step that will force Israel…to remove the siege…and if it happens it will be a remarkable achievement….We are 62 Hamad, Author interview 63 Yousef, Author interview 64 Abu Amer "Tahdiyah": 1 65 Wagemakers, "Legitimizing Pragmatism":372 speaking of a tactical tahdiya… As long as there is occupation, there is no other way but resistance". 66 The goal of durable ceasefire should have been regarded as a key component of conflict management and confidence building measures but it was not. 67 Despite its obvious role in initiating, negotiating, observing and ensuring the enforcement of ceasefires Hamas were still perceived by Israel and its key allies, such as the US, as promoting its counter-agenda with a fundamental impulse to the violent destruction of Israel. The argument that Hamas utilising ceasefires as "breathing space to rearm before resuming violence with even greater intensity and loss of life than before" became a self-fulfilling prophesy. 68 Hamas leaders had actually and repeatedly signalled otherwise. Hamas leaders appeared to be seeking the active intervention of mediators and monitors from the international community as a means of transitioning from conflict. As Hamas leader Usama Hamdan asserted "what we are seeking to have is a real ceasefire which can be guaranteed by the international community.
It has to prevent Israel from attacking the Palestinians and at the same time open our borders, and permit the Palestinian people to have a normal life". 69 Here the case was being articulated by Hamas in relation to the demand for the end of the Israeli blockade which for 8 years had collectively punished the entire population of the Gaza Strip. 70 But it was one which its enemy and mediators to the conflict could not hear. 71 Furthermore it was indeed all the more difficult to determine the intentions of the leadership of the movement when such ceasefires collapsed due to broader local and regional dynamics. It is important, therefore to recognise the contexts in which ceasefires broke down rather than assume causalities that might be less than clear. Hamas gave rise to forms of spoiler behaviours by Fatah whenever it perceived its rival as gaining ground over them domestically or externally, even with respect to cease-fires. 75 Fatah's attempts at hegemony over the framework of peace-building and negotiation was perceived as essential in terms of its legitimacy among Palestinians and with foreign donors.
Fatah were highly resistant to any attempts which would result in them becoming secondary actors. Secondly Israel's approaches and actions around ceasefire-collapse, violence and 72 Sharkov, "86.5% of Israelis" 73 Roy, Hamas and civil:229 74 Judis, "Ending the Israeli" 75 Abu Toameh, "How Arab rivalries" ceasefire making are highly problematic. In 2009, a study by Kanwisher et al concluded that contrary to popular perception in the Western media "it is overwhelmingly Israel that kills first after a pause in the conflict," leading to Palestinian retaliation and ceasefire collapse. 76 Israel had opportunities to engage in mutual negotiation of ceasefires and had averred from reciprocation. 77 Moreover, with recent developments of reciprocation and mutual ceasefire negotiation mediated by Egypt the internal schism in Israel's negotiating framework has again been exposed as tactical rather than substantive in terms of negotiating peace. 78 In the protracted and complex mediation processes that began to lead to the ceasefire arrangements to which Hamas would agree to Israel's belligerence was exposed. This is Hamas has used reconstruction funding issues rather than resistance claims to underscore its legitimacy in Gaza. For example, in 2009 Hamas's Ismail Said Radwan stated that the movement's priority was the establishment of a Higher Committee for Reconstruction. "The legitimate government and the national factions [in Gaza] will supervise the reconstruction project, in addition to Arab countries who are interested in helping out … We want aid to go to the people who deserve it". 84 In the wake of the war of 2014 that ambition for reconstruction was thwarted by the further degradation of Hamas's, along with the citizens of Gaza, capacities as a national resistance organisation and governing movement. Hamas had also lost important Arab allies who were no longer as interested or whose energies and resources were diverted to other conflicts in the region.
The prospect of Hamas and Israel negotiating a more permanent ceasefire has, since 2014, periodically been raised in public by both sides. There is little evidence, however, that the government of Netanyahu, has been willing to shoulder this initiative and thus engender support from its powerful allies. By 2016 the calm had largely been maintained but the precariousness of the status quo was recognised as no substitute for peace.
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that despite numerous ceasefires and pauses a political settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through negotiation which involves a key actor such as Hamas seems no nearer to resolution. Hamas has demonstrated that it is capable of engaging with the concepts of hudna and tahdiyah with demands from Israel that would, if adequately monitored and enforced be effective measures for confidence building. Hamas promotes these demands first and foremost as a localised Palestinian resistance organization that 'competes' with other Palestinian factions to claim the resistance for themselves and to frame and reframe it within some Islamist discourses -principally as it 84 Radwan, Author interview relates to jihad. In this respect they differ little from other resistance or liberation groups in Columbia, Northern Ireland or the Basque region in terms of their rhetoric about resistance but their recognition that inclusion to a political process can be sought through a ceasefire.
It is also clear that, unlike Columbia, Northern Ireland or the Basque region, the political actors with which Hamas contends with (such as Israel, the EU and the US) do not support or seek to utilise ceasefire as a mechanism for conflict resolution. This is because this would require such actors to dialogue with Hamas, negotiate with them and the admission of Hamas into a political or diplomatic process from which it has been firmly excluded.
Hamas appears to have discovered early on that in relation to Israel resistance to a negotiated ceasefire and continued policies of aggression including targeted assassination means that it will not engage in the measures that Hamas requires from it in return for a cessation of violence. In this respect the framework of occupation and a desire to control and subdue the Palestinians and to degrade or even finish Hamas means that the limited goal of a ceasefire is often viewed as an unsatisfactory half measure, especially by some in Israel's military and security institutions. 85 Despite this Hamas has continued to embark on such measures and in large part this is explained by its desire to emerge as a significant if not the most significant Palestinian actor and to marginalise the hegemonic hold of Fatah and the PA in terms of power.
Theological or Islamist discourse is not as significant in terms of Hamas's calculations as its mobilising discourse and rhetoric. Does this mean that in some ways Hamas has acculturated to the nationalist environment in which it was established and still operates in?
Certainly there is evidence of a dissonance between the rhetorical language of resistance (muqawama)/jihad and its decade-long participation in a variety of hudna and tahdiyah. If the evidence here is that Hamas acts as a political national movement then engaging it in 85 Catignani, "Variation" terms of reality rather than existential ideological threat holds out the slightest hope that the hudna could allow the movement to move beyond the "warrior's break" or tactical pause. The obstacle to such a course remains the framework for mediation, negotiation and reciprocation, and a need to understand the limits of proscription in the dialogue for peace.
